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INFORMATION WARF ARE: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF USING SATELLITES 
AND JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES IN PROPAGANDA BATTLES 
Mark J. Sundahl* 





mark.sundahl@law. csuohio. edu 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the right of states to broadcast propaganda by satellite in 
times of war. In exploring this issue, the author addresses the hypothetical question of 
whether a state may use DBS technology to broadcast a commercial news program, such 
as CNN, into an enemy state in wartime as part of a larger campaign to win the support of 
the civilian population. The author begins by establishing that that the consent of a 
receiving state is required prior to such broadcasts, whether in peacetime or in times of 
war. This requirement of "prior consent" is the only restriction of the broadcasting of 
such news programs since the programs do not rise to the level of illegal war propaganda 
nor would such broadcasts be prohibited by the international law demanding that outer 
space be used only for "peaceful purposes." This analysis concludes with the warning 
that the inviolability of the "prior consent" doctrine may be threatened by the recent 
adoption by the United States of a more relaxed theory of what measures may be taken 
under the right of self-defense. Finally, the author takes up the related question regarding 
the right of states to use jamming technologies to block illegal satellite transmissions. 
I. 	 INTRODUCTION defensive war as part of a larger 
campaign to win the support of the 
The fundamental question posed civilian population or at least counteract 
in this paper is whether a country has the misinformation promulgated on the 
right in times of war to use free-to-air ground. The scenario of broadcasting 
direct broadcasting satellite (DBS) commercial news programs was selected 
technology to broadcast commercial for this analysis because such 
news programming, such as CNN, into programming constitutes a mild form of 
an enemy state. A state may want to propaganda, as opposed to the more 
undertake such broadcasts during a likely illegal forms of propaganda that 
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to thank Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for supporting this research. This paper benefited from the 
able research assistance of Daniel Thiel. 
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incite sedition or racial hatred. The 
legalities of broadcasting news programs 
is less clear than in the case of more 
extreme war propaganda, and therefore 
raises more difficult and interesting 
questions. 
II. 	 "PRIOR CONSENT" AND OTHER 
RESTRICTIONS ON 
BROADCASTING PROPAGANDA 
The legality of DBS broadcasts 
of commercial news programming 
hinges on the applicability of certain 
doctrines of international law including 
the "prior consent" doctrine, the 
prohibition of war propaganda, and the 
requirement that outer space be used for 
"peaceful purposes." As explained 
below, the right to broadcast commercial 
news is in fact limited only by the "prior 
consent" doctrine. 
A. 	 The "Prior Consent" Doctrine 
The general rule governing 
television broadcasting using DBS 
technology is that the sending state must 
receive the consent of any receiving state 
before initiating transmission. This view 
is based on the fundamental principle of 
state sovereignty which has been broadly 
interpreted as granting states the right to 
control the flow of information across 
their borders. Although this rule is not 
recognized as settled law by all nations 
or scholars, evidence in the forms of 
international resolutions, declarations, 
regulations, and state practice almost 
certainly provides sufficient proof that 
customary international law requires 
prior consent. 
The primary document 
supporting the "prior consent" doctrine 
is the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution on Principles Governing the 
Use by States of Artificial Earth 
Satellites for International Direct 
Television Broadcasting (Resolution 
37/92).1 Paragraph 14 of Resolution 
37/92 provides that "an international 
direct television broadcasting satellite 
service shall only be established after the 
conditions set forth in Paragraph 13 ... 
have been met."2 Paragraph 13, in turn, 
requires a state intending to initiate DBS 
broadcasting into another state to "notify 
the proposed receiving State or States of 
such intention and . . . promptly enter 
into consultation with any of those 
States which so requests."3 
The "prior consent" doctrine is 
expressed even more clearly in Article 
IX of the 1972 UNESCO Declaration of 
Guiding Principles on the Use of 
Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow 
of Information, the Spread of Education 
and Cultural Exchange which requires 
states to "reach or promote prior 
agreements concerning direct satellite 
broadcasting to the population of 
countries other than the country of origin 
of the transmission. "4 
In addition, the 1978 UNESCO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
Concerning the Contribution of the Mass 
Media to Strengthening Peace and 
International Understanding to the 
Promotion of Human Rights and to 
Countering Racialism, Apartheid and 
Incitement to War (Mass Media 
1 Resolution on Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting, 
G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. Doc. A/37/646 (1982) 

[hereinafter, Resolution 37/92). 

2 Id. para. 14. 

3 Id. para. 13 (emphases added). 

4 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on 

the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free 

Flow of Information, the Spread of Education 

and Cultural Exchange, art. IX, U.N. Doc. 






Declaration) rejects the unlimited "free 
flow" approach by calling for a "wider 
and more balanced dissemination of 
information."5 This language has been 
interpreted by some commentators as 
permitting international prohibitions on 
the broadcast of objectionable media.6 
The regulations issued by the 
International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) also embrace the "prior consent" 
doctrine by requiring states to "reduce, 
to the maximum extent practicable, the 
radiation over the territory of other 
countries unless an agreement has been 
previously reached with such 
countries."7 In addition to this 
requirement for prior consent, the ITU 
regulations require that states be capable 
of immediately ceasing their broadcasts 
into other states if such states object to 
the transmission.s 
The alternative to the "prior 
consent" approach is the "free flow" 
doctrine which asserts that a sending 
state need not acquire the consent of a 
receiving nation prior to broadcasting 
into that state. Proponents of the "free 
flow" doctrine point to certain 
documents which, they claim, indicate 
an inviolable right of peoples to send 
UNESCO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles Concerning the Contribution of the 
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and 
International Understanding to the Promotion of 
Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, 
Apartheid and Incitement to War, art. IX, 
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/9.3/2, 20th Sess. 
(1978), reprinted in ANN. REV. U.N. AFF. 238­
40 [hereinafter, Mass Media Declaration]. 
6 See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Images from Abroad: 
Making Direct Broadcasting by Satellites Safe 
for Sovereignty, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. 
R. 329, 340 (l986). 

7 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio 

Conference for Space Telecommunications, ITU, 

Radio Regulations No. 2674 (1971), 23 U.S.T. 

1527, T.l.A.S. No. 7435 (1971). 

8 Id. No. 470V. 

and receive information, whether by 
satellite broadcasts or other means. 
Proponents of the "free flow" doctrine 
rely primarily on Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which provides that all people have the 
right "to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas through any media 
and regardless offrontiers." 9 Article 19 
of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains 
virtually identical language asserting the 
right of all people to send and receive 
information across borders. 10 
Although the language of the 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 
ICCPR celebrating the fundamental right 
to information appears to give strong 
support to the "free flow" theory, the 
doctrine of "prior consent" wins out for 
two reasons. 
First, although a reading of the 
above-mentioned documents may leave 
some ambiguity with respect to whether 
"prior consent" or "free flow" is the 
governing law, this ambiguity is 
resolved when state practice is taken into 
account. 11 The recognition of a 
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 
19, U.N. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/81 l 
(1948) (emphasis added). See also 
Recommendation 2 of the International 
Telecommunications Union which recommends 
that "Members of the Union facilitate the 
unrestricted transmission of news by 
telecommunication services." Recommendation 
2 of the International Telecommunications 
Union, Unrestricted Transmission of News and 
the Right to Communicate (1994), available at 
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/recommen 
dations/recom02.html. 
IO International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 19(2), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. 





11 Ambiguities are also present within the 

individual documents themselves. For example, 





customary international law requires 
evidence of the widespread and uniform 
practice of nations that engage in such 
practices out of a sense of legal 
obligation, or opinio iuris. 12 Although 
treaties, resolutions, and declarations are 
good source of evidence regarding 
customary international law, state 
practice can provide equally valid 
evidence. 13 And with respect to the 
issue of trans-border DBS broadcasting, 
state practice provides undeniable 
evidence that customary international 
law requires "prior consent." Virtually 
every country (and certainly all 
developed countries) regulate satellite 
transmissions into their country by way 
of rigorous licensing regimes. 14 Even 
the United States, which has been the 
strongest proponent of the "free flow" 
doctrine, regulates satellite transmissions 
through a rigorous licensing process 
administered by the Federal 
right of everyone to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas" which appears to support 
the "free flow" doctrine, despite the fact that the 
resolution takes a "prior consent" approach in its 
Article 19. Resolution 37/92, supra note l, 
preamble. For a discussion of internal 
ambiguities contained in the Mass Media 
Declaration see Paul, supra note 5, at 359. 
12 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A 
Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (with citations). 
13 Evidence of customary international law can 
be found in treaties, international court decisions, 
domestic court decisions, domestic legislation, 
state action, and scholarship. See Mariana 
Mello, Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the 
Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary 
International Law, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 365, 368 (2006). 
14 See Paul, supra note 6, at 347 ("Even a 
cursory review of actual country practice . . . 
would indicate that countries do not in fact 
recognize an asserted right to impart and receive 
information across national borders.") 
Communications Commission. is When 
divining a rule of customary 
international law, the opinio iuris of 
states carries great weight, and is most 
clearly expressed by a state's practices. 
The opinio iuris of the United States is 
undoubtedly that the "prior consent" 
doctrine governs DBS transmission. 
Otherwise, why would the United States 
adopt this approach in its domestic law 
in the form of license requirements? 
Once the weight of the United States is 
thrown behind the "prior consent" 
doctrine, there is little room left for 
arguing the "free flow" doctrine. 
Second, application of the lex 
specialis rule of treaty interpretation 
demands that the more specific 
international law requmng "prior 
consent" for DBS television 
broadcasting trumps the more general 
rule permitting the "free flow" of 
information across borders. The lex 
specialis maxim states that "special 
provisions are ordinarily more effective 
than those that are general." 16 Under the 
rule of lex specialis, since the "prior 
consent" doctrine is a more specific rule 
that applies exclusively to satellite 
broadcasting, it should override the 
15 For a detailed discussion of United States 
opposition to the "prior consent" doctrine (in 
contrast to its state practice) see DAYID I. 
FISHER, PRIOR CONSENT TO INTERNATIONAL 
DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING 139 
(1990). 
16 See, e.g., Robert Howse & Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory 
Strategy for GMOS - The Issue of Consistency 
With WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317, 322 (2000) (quoting 
Grotius). Although the principle of lex specialis 
was not codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, it is widely recognized as a 
customary international law of treaty 
interpretation. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA 




general pronouncements regarding the 
more generalized right to the "free flow" 
of information. 
For the foregoing reasons, 
international law is likely to require the 
consent of a receiving state before a 
sending state can transmit DBS 
television signals. Of course, under 
Article 28 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, this 
customary international law, once 
established, binds all nations.17 
B. The Prohibition of War Propaganda 
In addition to the requirement of 
"prior consent," DBS broadcastings 
could, depending on the content of the 
transmission, violate the international 
law prohibiting certain types of 
propaganda. 
There is no international 
agreement on a definition of propaganda. 
The most liberal approach defines 
propaganda as any "systematic attempt 
through mass communication to 
influence thinking and behavior."18 This 
definition of propaganda would capture 
even a fact-based news program, such as 
CNN, provided that it was broadcasted 
with the intent "to influence thinking and 
behavior." A more restrictive approach, 
as adopted by reference in the preamble 
of the Outer Space Treaty, is found in 
17 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945). See also, e.g., 
Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary 
International Law During Armed Conflict, 12 
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 602 (2006) 
(explaining that "when a customary norm comes 
into existence it is universally applicable.") 
18 LESLIE JOHN MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL 
PROPAGANDA: ITS LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC 
CONTROL 12 (1958); see also Stephen T. Bayer, 
The Legal Aspects ofTV Marti in Relation to the 
Law of Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 41 
EMORY L.J. 541, 550 (1992). 
United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 110 (II) which condemns "all 
forms of propaganda, in whatsoever 
country conducted, which is either 
designed or likely to provoke or 
encourage any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression."19 
Only the latter, hostile type of 
propaganda is prohibited by international 
law. This prohibition arises under treaty 
law as well as international customary 
law. The 1936 League of Nations 
Convention Concerning the Use of 
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace 
prohibits transmissions that "constitute 
an incitement either to war ... or to acts 
likely to lead thereto."20 Likewise, 
Article 20 of ICCPR prohibits "any 
propaganda for war."21 Both documents 
contemplate the inflammatory 
propaganda that actively provokes war. 
The ICCPR, in particular, should be 
interpreted narrowly in light of its 
original purpose, namely, to prohibit the 
fascist war propaganda machine used by 
the Third Reich to promote German wars 
of aggression.22 In addition to these 
explicit treaty prohibitions, it is widely 
recognized that customary international 
19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
110(11)), 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 93 (1947). The 
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNCOPUOS) has also defined 
propaganda as a hostile act intended to provoke 
war, incite sedition, interfere with the receiving 
state's internal affairs, slander the receiving 
state, or violate human rights. See U.N. GAOR 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
25th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105179 (1970). 
20 International Convention Concerning the Use 
of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, art. 2, 
Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301. 
21 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 20. 
22 See CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN 
LAW INITIATIVE, ICCPR LEGAL 
IMPLEMENTATION INDEX 140 (2003) 
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law prohibits war propaganda as well.23 
It can certainly be said that no country 
objects to such a prohibition.24 
Since news programs such as 
CNN do not actively incite war, the DBS 
transmission of commercial news 
programs should not be affected by the 
prohibition against war propaganda. 
C. The "Peaceful Purposes" Doctrine 
Direct satellite broadcasts in time 
of war may also be affected by the 
restrictions on the military use of space 
contained in the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) - which is 
often referred to as the Magna Carta of 
space law. 25 There are two ways to 
interpret the Outer Space Treaty with 
respect to the militarization of Earth 
orbits. One possible interpretation is 
that the military use of earth's orbit is 
permitted - with the sole limitation that 
no nation may place into orbit "any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction."26 This interpretation is 
founded on a plain language reading of 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 
23 See Elizabeth A. Downey, A Historical Survey 
of the International Regulation of Propaganda, 
in MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF 

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: 

REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL 

COMMUNICATIONS 341 (1984); see also Bayer, 





25 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 

of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 

Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 

Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 

(entered into force Oct. IO, 1967) [hereinafter, 

Outer Space Treaty]. 

26 Id. art. IV. 

which states that "[t]he Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be used by all 
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. "27 A plain reading 
of this provision suggests that the 
"peaceful purpose" requirement applies 
only to use of the Moon and celestial 
bodies - but does not apply to other 
regions of outer space, thus allowing for 
the militarization of the Earth orbits 
(with the exception of on-orbit weapons 
of mass destruction).28 
An alternative interpretation of 
the Outer Space Treaty relies on a more 
expansive reading of the treaty and holds 
that the "peaceful purpose" doctrine 
applies to all of outer space, including 
Earth orbits. This interpretation relies 
both on customary international law as 
reflected in the practice of states (which 
is incorporated into the Outer Space 
Treaty via Article III which states that 
the use of outer space shall be carried 
out "in accordance with international 
law") and on the language of the 
preamble to the Outer Space Treaty 
which emphasizes the "use of outer 
space for peaceful purposes" in two 
places.29 Commentators generally agree 
that customary international law requires 
that all of outer space, including earth 
orbits, be used only for "peaceful 
purposes. "30 
21 Jd. 
28 See GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 53 (1984) 
(arguing that the Outer Space Treaty requires 
"total neutralization and demilitarization of 
celestial bodies and [only] partial 
demilitarization of outer space"); Michel 
Bourbonniere, National-Security Law in Outer 
Space: The Interface of Exploration and 
Security, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 16 (2005) 
29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 25, preamble. 
30 See, e.g., Bourbonniere, supra note 28, at 16; 
Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial 
Communication Satellites: A New Look at the 
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How does this "peaceful 
purposes" requirement affect the use of 
communications satellites in time of 
war? Before we answer this, further 
analysis should be given to the meaning 
of the phrase "peaceful purposes." 
There are three basic approaches to the 
interpretation of the "peaceful purposes" 
doctrine. Under the first approach, some 
commentators argue for the absolute 
demilitarization of outer space.3 1 
Pursuant to the second approach, the 
word "peaceful" is treated as equivalent 
to "non-aggressive,'' thus allowing the 
military to use communications satellites 
for non-tactical support of military 
operations, such as for communications, 
navigation, and weather monitoring.32 
The third approach also adopts the "non­
aggressi ve" definition of "peaceful," but 
applies a broader interpretation which 
allows for the use of space assets, 
including satellites, for any action taken 
Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes", 
60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237, 242 (1994) 
(explaining that "[s]upport for the conclusion 
that current international law requires all of outer 
space to be used for "peaceful purposes" is 
compelling."). 
31 See, e.g., Ricky Lee, Reconciling 
International Space Law with the Commercial 
Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 194, 214 (2000) ("[T]he 
United States would ... not to undertake a new 
obligation involving the full demilitarisation of 
space. This interpretation is contrary to existing 
interpretations that are found in international 
law.") 
32 See, e.g., Robert L. Bridge, International Law 
and Military Activities In Outer Space, 13 
AKRON L. REV. 649, 658 (1979). This 
interpretation of the "peaceful purposes" doctrine 
relies heavily on the language of the UN Charter 
which states as its overarching goal 
"international peace and security," but at the 
time allows for military action to "suppress acts 
of aggression." Charter of the United Nations, 
art. 1, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945) 
[hereinafter, UN Charter]. 
in accordance with the UN Charter, thus 
allowing full military use of space for 
purpose of self-defense or as ordered by 
the UN Security Council.33 
Only under the first approach to 
the "peaceful purposes" doctrine might a 
state's DBS broadcasting of commercial 
news be restricted since this strict 
interpretation may be taken so far as to 
prohibit any use of space assets by the 
military, even if such use occurs in 
peacetime and is not related to a military 
strike.34 However, this would require 
the broadcast to be characterized as a 
military operation, which may not be 
easily determined. Moreover, since this 
strict interpretation requiring the total 
demilitarization of space does not find 
wide support, it is unlikely to create a 
bar to DBS broadcasting of a news 
program. Under the second approach, 
the use of satellites to broadcast news, 
even if part of a broader campaign to 
achieve a military victory, is likely to be 
deemed permissible since it is more akin 
to a non-tactical support activity in light 
of the fact that it bears no relation to a 
military strike. Finally, under the third 
approach DBS news broadcasts would 
be permissible even if deemed to be part 
of a tactical military operation, provided 
that the broadcast was part of a military 
33 This third approach reflects the principle 
stated in Resolution 3314 of the UN General 
Assembly which provides that "[a]ggression is 
the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations." United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX): Definition 
of Aggression, art. I, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. 
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). For a recent detailed 
discussion of various approaches to the "peaceful 
purposes" doctrine see Morgan, supra note 30. 
34 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 31, at 215. 
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campaign that was justified under the 
UN Charter. 
D. 	 Preliminary Conclusion: The "Prior 
Consent" Doctrine is the Only 
Restriction on the DBS Broadcasting 
of Commercial News Programs 
In light of the foregoing, the 
DBS transmission of news programs 
should not be banned by either the 
prohibition against war propaganda or 
the "peaceful purposes" doctrine. 
Therefore, the "prior consent" doctrine is 
the only restriction on broadcasting 
commercial news programs, such as 
CNN, into an enemy state in time of war. 
This brings us to the final question 
addressed in this paper, namely, whether 
the right to self-defense can excuse a 
state from having to comply with the 
"prior consent" requirement in times of 
war. 
III. "PRIOR CONSENT" IN TIMES OF 
WAR 
Having established that the "prior 
consent" requirement applies to DBS 
satellite broadcasts of commercial news 
under our hypothetical scenario, the final 
question now presents itself: can a state 
invoke the right ofself-defense as a basis 
for refusing to comply with the "prior 
consent" doctrine in times ofwar?35 
The right of a state to act in self­
defense is based on customary 
international law and is recognized in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter which 
35 It is assumed for purposes of the present 
discussion that the international law prohibiting 
broadcast without prior consent would continue 
in times of war. For further discussion regarding 
this issue see LaToya Tate, The Status of the 
Outer Space Treaty at International Law During 
"War" and "Those Measures Short ofWar", 32 J. 
SPACE L. 177 (2006) 
states that "(n]othing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs. "36 Under 
customary international law, the right of 
self-defense permits a state to respond to 
an armed attack with "measures which 
are proportional to the armed attack and 
necessary to respond to it."37 Therefore, 
a state would only be able to bypass the 
"prior consent" requirement if 
broadcasting into the enemy state was 
"necessary" for its defense. It is unlikely 
that a state could successfully make this 
argument in the context of the classical 
theory of self-defense which assumes 
that actions taken in self-defense are 
necessary in order to respond to an 
immediate threat. The broadcasting of a 
news program would not provide much 
protection against an immediate military 
threat. However, some nations have 
adopted a more liberal view which 
allows for anticipatory self-defense in 
the face of an imminent threat.38 
Moreover, in response to the growing 
threat of terrorism, the United States has 
further relaxed its understanding of the 
doctrine of self-defense to allow for 
military action to guard against a 
"continuing threat" even when no strike 
is known to be imminent.39 It is under 
this "continuing threat" theory of self­
defense that the "prior consent" 
requirement could, arguably, be set aside 
if DBS broadcasting of commercial 
news programs were deemed to be a 
necessary measure for the nullification 
36 UN Charter, supra note 32, art. 51. 

37 Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 

I.CJ. 14 (emphasis added). 

38 See, e.g., Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting 

Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of 

Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy, 





of a continuing terrorist threat. This 
argument of necessity could conceivably 
be based on the idea that force alone 
cannot defeat terrorism, but must be 
coupled with the free flow of 
information that can counteract 
misinformation and dispel the cultural 
misunderstandings that foster extremism. 
IV. 	THE RIGHT TO JAM ILLEGAL 
SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS 
The question regarding the right 
of a state to broadcast satellite television 
is only part of a greater debate. The 
complementary issue is whether, and to 
what extent, a state has the right to jam 
satellite television transmissions. 
As was true regarding the right to 
broadcast, there are two main schools of 
thought regarding jamming. Some argue 
that jamming violates the fundamental 
right of people to impart and receive 
information under Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Article 19 of the ICCPR, both of 
which provide that all people have a 
fundamental right "to seek, receive, and 
impart information and ideas."40 Others 
have argued that the right to jam 
unwanted signals goes hand-in-hand 
with a state's right to regulate the flow 
of telecommunications into its territory. 
It is argued that this right to use jamming 
technology is a necessary tool to assert 
state sovereignty and is complementary 
to the doctrine of "prior consent." Just 
as a state should not be subjected to 
media transmissions without its consent, 
so should a state have a right to jam a 
signal for which it has not given the 
required consent. 
In support of the legality of 
jamming, proponents have argued that 
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra 
note 9, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note IO, art. 19. 
the general proclamations of the right to 
exchange information are trumped, 
under the rule of lex specialis, by more 
specific expressions of international law 
which have permitted states to maintain 
sovereign control over media 
transmissions. Such commentators have 
looked primarily to Article 19(2) of the 
International Telecommunications 
Convention (ITC) which allowed states 
to stop transmissions that endanger the 
"security of the State or are contrary to 
their laws, to public order or to 
decency."41 Similarly, Article 20 of the 
ITC provided that a state may suspend 
"international telecommunications 
service" for an indefinite time (provided 
that the Secretary-General is notified).42 
However, the ITC has since been 
supplanted by the Constitution of the 
International Telecommunications Union 
(the "ITU Constitution") and the 
Convention of the International 
Telecommunications Union, which can 
be said to take a more liberal approach to 
the "free flow" of information.43 
Even without a strong argument 
on the basis of lex specialis, state 
practice supports a customary 
international law allowing the jamming 
of unwanted signals. Although the 
majority of examples of state practice of 
signal jamming involve totalitarian states 
such as Soviet Russia, Cuba, Libya and 
Iran, there are also examples of western 
democracies engaging in jamming, at 
41 International Telecommunications Convention, 
art. 19(2), 32 U.S.T. 3821 [hereinafter ITC]. 
42 Id. art. 20. 
43 Constitution of the International 
Telecommunications Union, available at 
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/ 
constitution.html [hereinafter ITU Constitution]; 
Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union, available at http:// 
www.ito.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/convention.html 
[hereinafter ITU Convention]. 
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least in times of war.44 Moreover, the 
practices of western states once again 
confirm that jamming is permissible as a 
customary international law in light of 
the pervasive licensing regimes that 
western countries administer. 
Unlicensed satellite broadcasts are not 
tolerated in any industrialized country. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to make 
the argument that such states do not 
support, at least to some extent, the 
principle that states have sovereign 
control over their media transmission in 
their territory.45 
Pursuant to the foregoing, states 
likely have the right under international 
law to jam illegal transmissions. This 
44 See David Hencke & Owen Gibson, Protest to 
Libya after Satellites Jammed, THE GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 3, 2005, available at 
http:llwww.guardian.co.ukllibya/story/0,,165691 
4,00.html (regarding Libya's jamming of two 
commercial satellites); Tom Carter, Castro 
Regime Jamming U.S. Broadcasts into Iran, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 16, 2003, available 
at http://www.washingtontimes.com/functionsl 
print.php?StorylD=20030715-114937-2635r 
(regarding Cuba's jamming of Telstar-12 
transmission of Voice of America broadcasts in 
Farsi into Iran); Bayer, supra note 18, at 572 
(describing how Cuba jammed TV Marti ­
broadcasted from an aerostat - within minutes of 
its launch in 1990); see also Adeno Addis, The 
Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in 
the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. l, 30 (2004). The significance of jamming by 
Cuba and other countries with respect ~to the 
formation of customary international law may be 
weakened if it is shown that such practices are 
conducted in secret, which would indicate that 
such practices do not reflect the country's opinio 
iuris. 
45 For further discussion regarding territorial 
sovereignty and media broadcasts see 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 
(1955). One question that presents itself here is 
whether an intermediate rule of customary 
international law can be formulated which only 
permits regulation of media transmissions in 
accordance with reasonable rules that are 
politically neutral. 
right applies to the jamming of war 
propaganda without question, but it is 
also likely to apply to the jamming of 
any transmission made without the 
receiving state's consent. However, 
there are certainly limits to what form 
the jamming can take. If the purpose of 
the jamming is merely to enforce the 
doctrine of "prior consent" or block the 
transmission of war propaganda, then the 
jamming should be limited to what is 
necessary to jam the objectionable 
signals. Causing greater interference 
than necessary would likely violate 
Article 45 of the ITU Constitution which 
prohibits states from causing "harmful 
interference" to the telecommunications 
of other states. 46 Similarly, the jamming 
would likely be subject to the 
proportionality requirement applicable to 
actions taken in self-defense (although 
application of the proportionality 
requirement in the absence of an armed 
or imminent attack is uncertain). 
Therefore, the jamming should be of no 
greater magnitude than necessary to 
obstruct the illegal transmission. 
Disproportional jamming can cause 
harm to innocent third parties who use 
neighboring transponders, as was the 
case when U.S. commercial radio 
broadcasters suffered revenue loss due to 
interference caused by Cuban jamming 
of Radio Marti.47 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both treaty law and customary 
international law require that a sending 
46 ITU Constitution, supra note 43, art. 45. 
47 See Bayer, supra note 18, at 570-71 & n. 191. 
The commercial broadcasters were compensated 
by the U.S. government pursuant to the Radio 
Broadcast to Cuba Act. See Compensation of 
Expenses to Mitigate Cuban AM Interference 
Cuban Interference, 97 F.C.C.2d 181 (1984). 
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state acquire the consent of a receiving 
state before using DBS broadcasting to 
transmit television programs, such as 
commercial news programs. The "prior 
consent" requirement is the only 
restriction under international law that is 
applicable to the broadcasting of such 
news programs since the programs do 
not rise to the level of illegal war 
propaganda nor would such broadcasts 
be prohibited by the international law 
demanding that outer space be used only 
for "peaceful purposes." Not restricted 
to peacetime, this requirement of "prior 
consent" continues in times of war. The 
only law of war that could threaten the 
integrity of the "prior consent" doctrine 
is a state's fundamental right to self­
defense. However, it is unlikely that the 
right to self-defense could be invoked as 
an excuse for failing to comply with the 
"prior consent" requirement since the 
broadcasting of news media could never 
be necessary for self-defense against an 
immediate threat. However, the 
inviolability of the "prior consent" 
doctrine may be threatened by the recent 
adoption by the United States of a more 
relaxed theory of self-defense. 
Finally, in the event that a state 
does broadcast into another state without 
first securing prior consent, the receiving 
state has the right to jam such 
broadcasts, with the sole proviso that 
any such jamming must be proportional 
so as to minimize unnecessary 
interference that might cause harm to 
innocent parties. 
References Cited 
I. Joel R. Paul, Images from Abroad: Making 
Direct Broadcasting by Satellites Safe for 
Sovereignty, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. R. 
329 (1986) 
2. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A 

Theory ofCustomary International Law, 66 U. 

CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) 

3. Mariana Mello, Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of 
the Emerging Notion ofHate Speech in 
Customary International Law, 28 LOY. L.A. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 365 (2006) 
4. DAYID I. FISHER, PRIOR CONSENT TO 
INTERNATIONAL DIRECT SATELLITE 
BROADCASTING (1990) 
5. Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for 
GMOS- The Issue ofConsistency With WTO 
Law: OfKine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 317 (2000) 
6. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1984) 
7. Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary 
International Law During Armed Conflict, 12 
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601 (2006) 
8. LESLIE JOHN MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL 
PROPAGANDA: ITS LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC 
CONTROL (1958) 
9. Stephen T. Bayer, The Legal Aspects ofTV 
Marti in Relation to the Law ofDirect 
Broadcasting Satellites, 41 EMORY L.J. 541 
(1992) 
10. Elizabeth A. Downey, A Historical Survey 
ofthe International Regulation ofPropaganda, 
in MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: 
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS (1984), 
11. GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (1984) 
12. Michel Bourbonniere, National-Security 
Law in Outer Space: The Interface of 
Exploration and Security, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 
3 (2005) 
13. Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of 
Commercial Communication Satellites: A New 
Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful 
Purposes", 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1994) 
364 
14. Ricky Lee, Reconciling International Space 
Law with the Commercial Realities ofthe 
Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 194 (2000) 
15. Robert L. Bridge, International Law and 
Military Activities Jn Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. 
REV. 649 ( 1979) 
16. LaToya Tate, The Status ofthe Outer Space 
Treaty at International Law During "War" and 
"Those Measures Short of War", 32 J. SPACE L. 
177 (2006) 
17. Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting Osama Bin 
Laden: Examining the Legality ofAssassination 
as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 
677 (2005) 
18. Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick 
Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2004) 




Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline 
Thu Dec 12 08:09:26 2019 
Citations: 
Bluebook 20th ed.���� 

MarkJ. Sundahl, Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 




MarkJ. Sundahl, Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 




Sundahl, M. (2006). Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 






MarkJ. Sundahl, "Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 




McGill Guide 9th ed.
 
MarkJ Sundahl, "Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 






Sundahl, MarkJ. "Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 
Jamming Technologies in Propaganda Battles." Proceedings on the Law of Outer Space,
 




MarkJ Sundahl, 'Information Warefare: The Legal Aspects of Using Satellites and
 




Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library
 
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License 
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. 
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device 
